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Response to Professor Farber’s “Regulatory Review in Anti-Regulatory
Times”
Richard J. Pierce, Jr. 1
Abstract
This is a response to an article by Professor Dan Farber presented in a symposium about the
Trump Administration and Administrative Law at Chicago-Kent School of Law. 2 After agreeing
with Professor Farber’s description, analysis and critique of the Trump Administration’s use and
abuse of cost benefit analysis as an aid in making regulatory decisions, Professor Pierce makes
four points: (1) President Trump will fail to implement his deregulatory agenda; (2) EPA’s
proposed rule on transparency of scientific evidence is a good start on an important project; (3)
the Clean Power Plan is a lost cause; and, (4) The Trump Administration may unintentionally end
the practice of applying cost benefit analysis to regulatory decisions.
A. Professor Farber’s Essay
I find much to praise and little to criticize in Professor Farber’s contribution to this symposium.
He does an admirable job of describing and explaining cost-benefit analysis (cba) and its role as
a tool that the last five presidents have used as an aid to deciding when and how to regulate
health, safety and environmental risks. 3 He includes a historical account of the ways in which the
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) has performed its assigned task of
coordinating the application of cba to regulatory decision making. 4

Lyle T. Alverson Professor of Law, George Washington University.
Daniel A; Farber, Regulatory Review in Anti-Regulatory Times, ___Chicago-Kent L. Rev. ____(2019). .
3
Id. at ___.
4
Id. at ___.
1
2

1

Professor Farber follows his historical account of the use of cba over the past thirty-five years
with descriptions and critiques of the unconventional manner in which the Trump Administration
is using, abusing, and ignoring cba in its single-minded attempt to further President Trump’ s
deregulatory agenda. 5 He describes the Executive Order in which President Trump made clear
his insistence that regulatory agencies and OIRA ignore the benefits of rules and consider only
their costs in the process of repealing at least twice as many rules as they issue and maintaining
a zero increased regulatory cost budget. 6 He then describes the ways in which OIRA and
regulatory agencies have attempted to respond to the president’s demand that they make
dramatic changes in their missions and in their ways of considering regulatory costs and
benefits.7
Professor Farber does a particularly good job of describing and explaining the three principal
ways in which OIRA and regulatory agencies in the Trump Administration are attempting to
manipulate cba to provide a basis to repeal environmental rules in general, and rules intended
to mitigate climate change in particular. 8 First, they increase the discount rate used to estimate
the present value of the future harms caused by climate change. Second, they eliminate
consideration of all harms that are likely to take effect outside the United States. Since most of
the damage caused by climate change will take place outside the United States and well into the
future, those changes reduce dramatically the estimated benefits of taking any action that has
the potential to mitigate climate change. Third, they eliminate consideration all co-benefits of a
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rule. Since most actions that would mitigate climate change by reducing carbon dioxide emissions
would also reduce emissions of particulate matter, eliminating consideration of co-benefits
eliminates the benefits to human health that any change in emissions of particulate matter would
yield.
Professor Farber is appropriately cautious in his characterizations of the performance of the
individuals and institutions that have played roles in the regulatory process in the Trump
Administration. Given the short period of time in which OIRA has been functioning in the Trump
Administration, Professor Farber characterizes any evaluation of its performance as “highly
theoretical” and concludes that “it is unclear whether OIRA is performing effectively as an
objective overseer of deregulation.” 9 He also speculates that OIRA “might also lack as much
leverage in deregulatory cases” as it has exercised in regulatory cases over the past thirty five
years. 10
I share Professor Farber’s suspicion that OIRA lacks its historic degree of leverage at present.
OIRA is a tiny, underfunded and understaffed agency. 11 Its roughly three dozen civil servants and
two young political appointees are no match for a president who has shown unprecedented
prowess as a bully.
I will add to Professor Farber’s excellent analysis two causes for optimism about the future and
two causes for pessimism about the future.
B. Causes for optimism
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1. President Trump Will Fail to Implement his Deregulatory Agenda
President Trump has stated his intention to repeal 70% of all rules that now exist, including all
rules that were issued after 1960.12 The performance of his administration to date makes that
extraordinarily ambitious claim laughable. There is a good chance that he will accomplish virtually
nothing in his effort to repeal major rules. The administration has enjoyed no significant success
in its efforts to implement its agenda during its first two years.
Regulatory agencies in the Trump Administration have attempted to suspend or to delay twenty
rules that were issued during the Obama Administration. As Connor Raso has documented,
courts rejected nineteen of those attempts—a 95% failure rate.13 As Rob Glicksman and Emily
Hammond have documented, the people who have headed the major regulatory agencies in the
Trump Administration during its first two years have demonstrated such a lack of understanding
of basic principles of administrative law that the vast majority of their deregulatory efforts to
date have been rejected by courts. 14
The administration claims to have repealed hundreds of rules that were issued during the Obama
Administration, but the vast majority of those rules were guidance documents that have no
legally-binding effect. 15 Guidance documents can influence the behavior of regulated firms, but
they do not have effects that are even remotely comparable to the effects of the hundreds of
major rules that were issued during the Obama Administration.
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In its semi-annual report issued in October 2018, OIRA claimed that the administration had
eliminated 57 rules between October 2017 and September 2018.16 As Stuart Shapiro has
explained, those actions were “comparable to the types of deregulatory actions taken by the
Obama Administration” and are “extremely unlikely” to have “any appreciable effect on the
economy.” 17
Turning to the future, I share Professor Farber’s belief that the notice and comment process is
far too difficult to navigate to permit the Trump Administration to enjoy any success in its attempt
to repeal two rules for every one new rule it issues. 18 Consider, for instance an attempt to repeal
any major rule that EPA has issued to implement the Clean Air Act. After going through the long
and arduous notice and comment process, the agency would have to persuade a court that an
action that will increase air pollution is consistent with the Clean Air Act, that the agency has
good reasons to repeal the rule even though a court previously held that the agency had good
reasons to issue the rule, and that the original EPA/OIRA estimate that the rule would have
benefits that are many times greater than its costs was so far off the mark that the court should
consider reasonable the new EPA/OIRA estimate that the costs of the rule exceed its benefits.
Agencies in the Trump Administration will rarely, if ever, be successful in making that
combination of arguments.
I also share Professor Farber’s belief that the result of Trump’s two-for-one Executive Order “will
be that the agency will be able to issue fewer new regulations . . . .” 19 I do not consider that
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cause for despair, however. Thanks to its outstanding efforts in the past, EPA has already issued
rules that have dramatically improved the quality of the environment and that produce annual
net social benefits of $1.9 trillion under the Clean Air Act alone.20 Other regulatory agencies have
made similar extraordinary advances in other fields. The U.S. can survive a four-year hiatus on
issuance of new rules without great hardship.
Moreover, even in the Trump Administration regulatory agencies will issue some important new
rules. Agencies proposed three major rules during the four month period between August and
November, 2018: CMS proposed a rule that is intended to reduce the price of prescription
drugs; 21 EPA proposed a rule that would reduce emissions of pollutants from trucks; 22 and, FDA
proposed a rule that is intended to slow the growing epidemic of smoking and vaping that is
having significant adverse effects on the health of young people.23
A temporary slowdown in the rate at which agencies issue new rules may also have unintended
beneficial effects. As one senior agency scientist described the situation to me recently “At last I
will have some time to devote to the research I have been putting off for years.”
2. EPA’s Proposed Rule to Improve the Transparency of Scientific Evidence Is a Good
Start on an Important Project
My second reason for optimism relates to one of the few areas in which I disagree with Professor
Farber. He discusses with obvious concern the proposed rule that EPA describes as an effort to
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increase the transparency of EPA’s use of scientific evidence. 24 I share Professor Farber’s fear
that the actual motive for the proposed rule is to undermine “key studies that have helped to
justify stricter limits on air pollution.” 25 Thus, for instance, the findings in a six-city study
conducted by researchers at Harvard provided much of the scientific support for the rule that
EPA issued in 1997 to reduce emissions of particulate matter. 26 The researchers refused to
provide to anyone, including EPA, the data on which the study was based or the codes and models
the researchers used to derive their findings from that data. Regulated firms argued
unsuccessfully that EPA should not consider the findings in the study because of that refusal. If
EPA had not been able to consider the six-city study, it probably would not have been able to
support adequately the reduction in the permissible level of emissions of particulate matter that
the Supreme Court upheld.
Notwithstanding my concern about the motives of EPA in the Trump Administration, I think we
need to consider seriously the need for a rule of the type EPA has proposed. Congress was
sufficiently concerned about the problem of lack of transparency of scientific evidence that it
enacted the Information Quality Act in 2001.27 That statute is intended to encourage agencies to
rely only on scientific evidence that can be verified.
While there is no reason to doubt the validity of the six-city study, there is increasing evidence
that many studies produced by highly regarded researchers and research institutions are not
reliable and should not be the basis for any important government decision. In 2018 alone,
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Harvard, Cornell, Dartmouth, and Sloan Kettering have admitted that some of their top
researchers committed academic fraud in conducting some of the most important studies that
those institutions have produced. 28 Moreover, attempts to replicate the findings of many other
important studies have been unsuccessful.29 That is powerful evidence that the scientific
community has not been doing an adequate job of ensuring that the science it produces is
reliable. A study with findings that cannot be replicated is not a scientific study. The ability to
replicate the findings of a study is a core part of the definition of the scientific method.
It will be difficult to craft workable rules to govern the need to assure that regulatory decisions
are based on reliable scientific evidence. The concern that is mentioned most frequently is
potential invasion of the privacy of the individuals who are the subjects of a study. That problem
is relatively easy to manage, however. Researchers rarely need information that identifies the
subjects of a study to attempt to replicate the findings of the study. It is easy to redact all such
information from the material that is made available to the agency and to other parties who have
an interest in attempting to replicate the findings of a study.
The more difficult problems lie in the area of intellectual property. Many researchers and
research institutions consider the data on which a study is based, as well as the model that was
used in conducting the study and the computer code that represents that model, to be valuable
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intellectual property that they own. It will be difficult to draft rules in this area that reconcile the
need for transparency with the intellectual property rights of the individuals and institutions that
perform the scientific research that agencies need to be able to rely on in making decisions.
That task is so important, however, that we must undertake it. It should be made a bit easier by
the fact that most of the findings on which agencies rely are the result of studies that were
conducted through the use of government funds provided in research grants. The granting
agencies can add transparency conditions to their grants, albeit at some cost in the form of
reduced enthusiasm to obtain research grants. The EPA’s proposed rule on transparency in
scientific evidence provides a good starting point to embark on this difficult decision making
process.
C. Causes for Pessimism
I. The Clean Power Plan Is a Lost Cause
My causes for pessimism also arise with respect to issues on which I differ with Professor Farber.
Professor Farber briefly describes the Clean Power Plan (CPP) that EPA issued during the Obama
Administration and the Affordable Clean Energy Plan (ACE) that EPA in the Trump Administration
has proposed to replace the CPP. 30 He compares the expected significant effects of the CPP as a
means of mitigating climate change with the uncertain and undoubtedly much lower beneficial
effects of the ACE.31 He goes on to criticize the proposal to replace the CPP with the ACE on the

30
31

Farber, infra. Note 1, at ___.
Id. at ___.

9

basis that the cba that EPA conducted to support its decision to replace the CPP with the ACE is
severely flawed. 32
I agree with Professor Farber’s views that the CPP would have produced large net benefits, that
the ACE has the potential to produce much lower benefits if it produces any benefits at all. I also
agree that the cba that EPA conducted to support its decision to replace the CPP with the ACE is
badly flawed. This is a good case to illustrate one of the most important limits on cba, however.
It makes no difference whether an agency action will produce large net benefits if the agency
lacks the power to take the action.
Professor Farber accurately states that EPA in the Trump Administration decided to propose to
replace the CPP with the ACE based on its adoption of the argument by the opponents of the CPP
that EPA lacks the statutory authority to issue the CPP. 33 The opponents of the CPP argued that
it exceeds EPA’s power because it required action “beyond the fence line” of a generating plant.
Specifically, it required owners of electricity generating plants to switch from heavy reliance on
plants that use high carbon content coal to increased use of a combination of plants that use
lower carbon content natural gas and plants that use zero carbon content wind and solar.
It is highly likely that a five-Justice majority of the Supreme Court also adopted that argument,
however. The Supreme Court took the unprecedented action of staying the CPP before any court
had occasion to consider its merits.34 The five-Justice majority did not state its reasons for issuing
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the stay, but the majority necessarily concluded that the petitioners were likely to prevail on the
merits. 35
As Emily Hammond and I have explained, the strongest argument the petitioners made in support
of the stay was the argument that the CPP exceeded EPA’s power because it required actions
“beyond the fence line.” 36 It is highly likely that a majority of Supreme Court Justices concluded
that the “beyond the fence line” argument was likely to prevail on the merits. It is theoretically
possible but highly unlikely that a member of the majority will change his mind if the Court ever
has occasion to address the merits of the CPP.
Without the ability to regulate conduct beyond the fence line, EPA can take no action that would
have a significant effect on emissions of carbon dioxide from generating plants—the most
important of the greenhouse gases that cause anthropogenic climate change. Congress is unlikely
to give EPA greater power to mitigate climate change or to take any other action that would be
effective for that purpose.
Even when the Democrats controlled the White House, the House of Representatives and the
Senate, they were unsuccessful in their attempt to enact a statute that would have created a cap
and trade system for carbon dioxide—the primary mitigation mechanism that the European
Union relied on in its unsuccessful attempt to mitigate climate change. The Democraticallycontrolled Congress was unwilling even to consider imposing a large carbon tax—the mitigation
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mechanism that would have the greatest beneficial effect.37 Climate change rarely breaks into
the list of the top ten public concerns in opinion polls—it is far below healthcare, immigration,
jobs or national security in the list of concerns of the public. The overwhelming rejection of a
modest carbon tax in a referendum conducted in environmentally friendly Washington State on
November 6, 2018, reflects the reality that the U.S. electorate does not support effective means
of mitigating climate change. 38
The prospects for effective mitigation of climate change are far worse in other countries. Even
without the CPP, the U.S. has been far more effective than any other country in mitigating climate
change. 39 That success has been driven primarily by the fracking revolution that has made
available a large supply of natural gas at low prices. By switching many generating plants from
coal to less expensive natural gas, the U.S. has reduced its emissions of carbon dioxide by far
more than any other country.
The increasingly hopeless nature of efforts to mitigate climate change is illustrated by a
comparison of the global emission trajectory the United Nations (UN) recently found to be
required to mitigate climate change with the actual global emissions trajectory predicted by the
International Energy Agency (IEA). The UN found that global emissions of carbon dioxide would
have to decrease dramatically every year to have a realistic prospect of mitigating climate
change. 40 By contrast, the IEA predicts that global emissions will increase every year until 2040.
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Most of the increase is expected to come from developing countries that are just beginning to
introduce energy-intensive innovations like automobiles and air conditioning that we have long
taken for granted.41
It is time to refocus our attention from an increasingly futile attempt to mitigate climate change
to an increasingly essential attempt to adapt to climate change. It will take a lot of hard work
over many years to devise and to implement measures that will allow us to live with the increases
in the frequency and severity of forest fires, storms, droughts, floods, and regional famines that
will come with climate change.
2. The Trump Administration May Kill CBA
As Professor Farber explains, the cost-only regulatory budget that President Trump is attempting
to implement necessarily is based on the assumption that the cba estimates that OIRA and
regulatory agencies have relied on for the last thirty-five years were seriously in error. He argues
that, “if those assumptions are valid, it would seem to make more sense to abolish cba.” 42 He
concludes that “the status of cba at present is shaky.” 43
To illustrate the situation, consider the Trump Administration’s treatment of the cost of carbon.
As Professor Farber describes, an inter-agency task force developed an estimate of the cost of
carbon that has been used as the basis for many regulatory actions.44 Given the high social costs
caused by emissions of carbon dioxide, OIRA and the regulatory agencies estimated that the
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benefits of many actions that would reduce emissions of carbon dioxide would vastly exceed the
costs of the actions. The Trump Administration has expressed the view that the inter-agency
estimate overstated the cost of carbon by as much as 96%. 45 If the new estimate is accurate, all
of the actions that regulatory agencies have taken to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide required
regulated firms to incur costs that are many times greater than the benefits of the actions.
I agree with Professor Farber that the Trump Administration’s attempts to manipulate cba to
yield estimates of large net costs, rather than large net benefits, attributable to most regulatory
actions casts doubt on the future viability of cba as a regulatory tool. As a long-time skeptic about
the value of using cba to aid in making regulatory decisions, Professor Farber may welcome this
effect of the Trump Administration’s idiosyncratic approach to cba. As a long-time supporter of
the use of cba as a regulatory tool, I strongly dislike this potential unintended effect of President
Trump’s deregulatory efforts.
Professor Farber illustrates the potential beneficial effects of cba in his description and analysis
of the actions that the Republican Congress took through use of the Congressional Review Act
(CRA) to repeal fourteen rules that were recently issued by the Obama Administration. He
searched for some reasoning process that could explain why Congress decided to repeal some
rules and to leave other rules in effect.46 He expressed surprise that he could identify no
reasoning process that could explain those decisions. 47
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I am not surprised by the apparent irrationality of the congressional process of deciding which
rules to repeal. My decades of experience in dealing with politicians in both Congress and the
Executive Branch has left me with the firm belief that most politicians make decisions solely
based on political salience. If something has happened recently to cause some important
constituency to become upset over either arguable underregulation or arguable overregulation
in some context, politicians act in response to the views expressed by those constituencies.
Politicians rarely use any rational decision making process to decide whether to act or how to
act. Since the political salience of a regulatory dispute does not vary systematically depending on
the actual costs and benefits of a potential regulatory action, politicians often make irrational
decisions that can be identified easily by cba as either overregulation or underregulation of a risk.
I share the belief of Richard Revesz and Michael Livermore that cba provides a “way of disciplining
the wide discretion given to administrative agencies, thereby ensuring that decisions are made
based on reasoned analysis and uniform criteria.” 48 When presidents required agencies to
subject their decisions to cba and to review by the economists at OIRA, agencies responded by
giving economists a voice in the decision making process and by retaining the services of some
of the best regulatory economists in the world.49 The introduction of cba as a regulatory tool did
not produce an environment in which agencies ceased regulating, as the critics of cba predicted.
It produced instead an environment in which the quality of agency decision making improved
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and in which agencies have issued rules that produce well over a trillion dollars in annual net
benefits to society.
The Trump Administration is trying to portray cba as a process that has produced government
estimates that a regulatory action will result in hundreds of billions of dollars in net benefits when
the action actually will produce hundreds of billions of dollars in net costs. I fear that any success
it enjoys in persuading courts or the public that cba is that prone to error will have the effect of
eroding public support for cba and encouraging future presidents to abandon the use of cba as
an aid to making regulatory decisions.
Conclusion
I hope that some of my predictions will prove to be accurate. I would like to see President Trump
fail in his attempt to return the U.S. to its dangerously polluted state in 1960, and I would like to
see EPA solve the difficult problems that are posed by its attempt to improve the quality of the
scientific evidence on which it relies.
I hope that my pessimistic predictions prove to be inaccurate. I hope that the global community
is successful in devising and implementing methods of effectively mitigating climate change, and
I hope that the Trump Administration’s abuse of cba does not have the unintended effect of
eliminating cba as a tool for use in making regulatory decisions.
In any event, I am confident that Professor Farber’s excellent discussion of the many issues that
are raised by the Trump Administration’s deregulatory program will be extremely useful in the
process of ensuring that we retain effective means of making rational regulatory decisions.
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